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This paper provides an overview of the Islamic banking system and its product 
ranges, and examines their ability to meet Corporate Social Responsibility 
obligations while maintaining efficiency and managing risk. The growing 
literature on Islamic banking products, including their derivatives indicates that 
Islamic banking is popular worldwide and has global attention. Similarly, the 
diversity of banking options is growing in Middle Eastern countries with some 
banks offering separate windows for conventional and Islamic banking options 
to customers. Due to the unique nature of Islamic banking, which is constrained 
not only by the standard operating regulations of the respective countries, 
but also by Islamic law, the Sharī’ah, there are significant differences in the 
philosophy behind its finance transactions, the nature of transactions, goals and 
the obligations between the two types of institutions. Whether these differences 
lead to changes in risk preferences, lending decision-making processes, and the 
ultimate efficiency of operations are some of the key empirical questions yet to 
be fully answered. The paper introduces a theory based on classical utility theory, 
and then extends it to show its relevance to Islamic banking. In particular this 
paper shows that Islamic banking may not only improve operating performance, 
but also increase profitability for all parties concerned.
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1. Introduction
Islamic banking is growing fast, but the increase in the size of Islamic banking IB 
is questionable (Abdallah & Delpachitra, 2008). Over the past decade, Islamic 
banking has substantially broadened its publicity worldwide by taking overall 
leadership in many Islamic communities. For instance, total Islamic assets 
worldwide expanded from US$137 billion in 1996 to approximately US$900 
billion in 2010, a linear annual growth rate of 40%: in 2013, the size is reported 
to be US$1,700 billion. Despite this progress, the total volume of international 
Delpachitra: Is Islamic banking capable of meeting corporate social responsibi
50                         The International Journal of Banking and Finance, Vol. 10. Number 2, August  2013: 1-24
transactions is still very small, as would be the case of a niche banking with just 
about 50 year history. However, the growing credibility of the Islamic principle-
driven, interest-free financial intermediary based on either fee-based or profit-
shared pricing of financial products in the international financial markets and the 
positive evidence of its adaptations worldwide in particular, should receive the 
attention of regulators, researchers and investors. The growth of credibility is 
considered the driving force behind creating a viable alternative, at least where 
the customers demand such products as being more in line with human ethics, to 
the conventional banking system.
On closer inspection, both the conventional and IB systems have 
similarities and differences. Both systems focus on the classical wisdom of 
shareholder or corporate wealth maximization. However, Islamic banking 
attempts to achieve these objectives through a set of Islamic laws (Sharīʿah) that 
basically prevents managing the financial institution (and the market) through 
the margins of interest income and interest cost. Basically it promotes principal–
agent relationships in financial transactions in which profits or returns reflecting 
pure opportunity costs are divided among stakeholders fairly and equitably. In 
that sense this paper assumes that the Islamic banks should play a role similar to 
that of a venture capitalist (VC). 
On the other hand, as Sairelly (2007, p 279) states, the ethical credentials 
of Islamic financial institutions make them attractive to not only Muslims, 
but also to a wide spectrum of ethically-conscious consumers who desire a 
socially just financial system. By extending this proposition to the basic role 
of the financial system, both saving and borrowing units expect that the Islamic 
financial intermediation ensures that returns are distributed (among investors, 
entrepreneurs and other stakeholders) in a socially responsible manner. Based on 
the guidance from the Holy Text¾the Qurãn¾the rules for Islamic economic and 
financial practices, for individual entrepreneurs and investors, and institutional 
investors should not only be concerned with what kind of business transactions 
they should be involved with, but also with how such businesses should be 
funded, because Islamic transactions should not only be Sharīʿah-compliant 
(ḥalāl) but should also be free of exploitation of the weak, free of interest (ribā) 
and exclude prohibited transactions such as those involving gharar, etc.
Sairally (2007) pinpoints a number of criticisms of the practice of Islamic 
finance. These criticisms cover the heavy bias towards ‘mark-up financing’ 
contracts (murābaḥah) in profit-and-loss-sharing arrangements, and ‘trustee 
finance’ contracts (murābaḥah): it is also claimed that Islamic banking is 
mirroring the practices of conventional banking. These criticisms were further 
supported by Abdallah and Delpachitra (2008) suggesting that IB uses identical 
strategies in risk preference and risk profiling to those of conventional banking. 
Despite these criticisms, it can be shown that IB provides the best solution to 
the issue of ethically and socially responsible banking. In this paper, we try 
to establish that. Essentially this paper shows that if the principles of Sharīʿah 
are applied, IB participation in the financial system can improve the operating 
performance of firms, and as IB shares a higher percentage of profits with 
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entrepreneurs, the investee firms’ operating performance is improved. This 
provides more incentives for IB to act in a socially responsible manner. 
This paper is organized as follows. Section 2 provides a brief overview 
of IB transactions relevant to this paper. Section 3 introduces the concept of 
Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR) and its relevance to IB. Section 4 provides 
a detailed description of the quantitative framework for classical interpretation of 
principal-agent relationships using utility functions. The last section summarizes 
and concludes this paper. 
2.  Islamic Banking Transactions
Islamic banks are required to comply with Islamic ethics and in order to do 
so every Islamic bank must have a board of Sharīʿah scholars, or a Sharīʿah 
Supervisory Board (SSB) to review the juristic correctness of the bank’s 
transactions (Archer & Karim, 2002). Furthermore, as Sarker (1999) points out, 
the primary objectives of Islamic finance cover broad-based economic wellbeing, 
social and economic justice, and equitable distribution of income and wealth. 
In order to achieve these objectives, different Islamic financial instruments 
and their derivative products have been introduced by Islamic institutions. For 
instance, mark-up pricing (murābaḥah), ultimately creates instruments to finance 
economic transactions. Consequently, murābaḥah is ‘a common instrument used 
for short-term financing based on the conventional concepts of purchase finance’ 
(Dhumale & Sapcanin, 2003, p. 34). The seller reports to the buyer the cost of 
acquiring or producing a good, and then a profit margin is negotiated between 
the two parties. ‘Typical asset-backed security in the conventional system is a 
claim against a pool of assets; Islamic instruments are claims against individual 
assets’ (Anwar, 2003, p. 63). A distinct feature of such financial securities is 
that they resemble conventional debt securities characterised by a predetermined 
pay-off, with the difference being that Islamic instruments and their derivatives 
are collateralized against a real asset or economic activity. 
In contrast in ‘trustee finance’ (murābaḥah) contracts, a principal with 
capital can develop a partnership with an agent (or entrepreneur) who has 
expertise in deploying capital in real economic activities with an agreement to 
share the profits (Hasan, 2002). Losses are borne by the capital owner only, as 
the other party does not hold any capital. Further, though the capital owner is 
exposed to loss or risk, he is not entitled to participate in the management of the 
funds; this is exclusively left to the other partner. However this form of funding 
is no more than at best 25% of the total funding by banks given its huge still 
unresolvable asymmetric information problem.
Furthermore, in ‘equity participation’ (mushārakah), which is a share-
like arrangement, the capital owner enters into a partnership by contributing 
equity together with the entrepreneur(s). Their contributions need not be equal, 
and contributions may be in the form of physical or monetary assets. Intangible 
capital, such as labour, management, skill and goodwill can form part of the 
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capital (Lewis & Algaoud, 2001). Profits can be shared in any pre-agreed ratio, 
but losses must be borne strictly in proportion to equity participation. This 
contract is suitable for long-term project financing. Some scholars consider this 
to be the purest form of Islamic finance since according to them it is closest to 
the spirit of Sharīʿah, does not have exploitative provisions, and is a fairly equal 
contract for both parties. Mushārakah financing is closer to a traditional equity 
stake with rights of control. 
In between these three commonly used instruments and their derivatives 
of mushārakah, murābaḥah and murābaḥah, there are other collateralized 
securities, such as ijārah (similar to a lease or a lease purchase arrangement), 
kafālah and amānah contracts. These instruments can be classified exclusively 
into transactional and intermediation contracts in an Islamic financial system. 
Transactional contracts govern retail sector transactions that include exchange, 
trade and other financing activities. The intermediation contracts not only govern 
indirect financial instruments, but also facilitate the efficiency and transparency 
of the execution of transactional contracts (El-Hawary, Grais & Iqbal, 2004). 
In each of these cases, IB ensures that transactions comply with not 
only prudential standards, but also with the rules of Sharīʿah, to ensure a fair 
deal for both contracting parties unlike in interest-only contract, which is one-
sided. From a historical point of view profit-and-risk-shared contracting was 
the dominant form of funding economic activities until the birth of fractional 
banking some 250 years ago. The old practice was replaced slowly with interest-
only no-risk-sharing lending as a one-sided cheaper form of lending while banks 
used deposits to create more money on each dollar of deposits to make more 
interest-based no-risk-shared lending.
3.  CSR and Islamic Banking
Islamic finance, given its ethical characteristics some of which has been 
highlighted in the previous section, is often associated with ethical investment, 
which itself is linked to socially responsible investing. The restrictions on 
investment choices such as prohibition of investment in armaments sector, 
pornography, etc. are important examples. The concepts in question are similar. 
An Islamic bank provides financial services according to religious precepts in 
the same way as ethical finance also focuses on moral values (Guyot, 2009). 
At a contemporary time when capitalism is growing blindly as 
evidenced by financial scandals such as those of Enron and later the Maddof 
scam, the notion of ethics has jumped for attention and companies are reflecting 
more and more on ethics. Many organizations are now displaying their ethical 
and moral concerns in the media. The aim is to reassure stakeholders (i.e., any 
party or person who maintains links, or indirectly are linked to a company such 
as suppliers, customers, shareholders, etc.), that all their interests matter to the 
company, not just the profits. This paper considers ethics as an integral part of 
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CSR. Howard R. Bowen is often seen as the founder of CSR after publication 
of his book titled Social Responsibilities of the Businessman (Bowen, 1953) in 
which he attempts to convince business leaders to avoid regulatory constraints 
that reduce their freedom of action. According to the liberal vision of North 
America, ‘businessmen should therefore incorporate the public interest in their 
decisions’ (Acquires & Aggeri, 2008). Since this contribution from Bowen, the 
definition of CSR was gradually reformulated. That facilitated further research 
on CSR. According to Carroll (1979), CSR refers to ‘the expectations of society 
towards the company in the economic, legal, ethical and discretionary plans’.
In this context of CSR, socially responsible investment (SRI) has been 
developed as a form of ethical finance. We talk about SRI when ‘the primary 
purpose of the investment is profitable but additional constraints are imposed’ 
(Winant, 2008). However, we should be cautious about the conceptual vagueness 
that still exists between various forms of investment despite avowed commitment 
to CSR. Unless each product is designed with CSR concerns and there is a 
body of regulations to certify that as a fact in the design of financial products, 
statement such as what we quoted holds no binding commitment. Socially 
responsible investments are selected on ‘ethical characteristics, assessed by the 
rating agencies’ (Winant, 2008) Thus, Islamic finance can be considered a form 
of socially responsible finance in that it chooses legal and lawful financial assets, 
but both have their difference in religious character.
4.  Islamic Banking: A Classical View
In general business, entities are growing larger and more complicated than ever 
with an increasing number of business models. In many cases ownership and 
management are separated. As a result, the agents or the management tend to put 
their personal interests as the top priority (Lin, 2004). They initiate decisions to 
maximize their benefits, instead of the principals’ benefits, let alone stakeholders’ 
benefits. Due to the principals’ limited capabilities to process information, 
agency issues are created.
As noted before, IB differs from conventional financial institutions and 
investors because IB not only provides funds and services to the investee firms, 
but also supervises the investee firms based upon their investment plans and 
their compliance to a set of religiously-oriented restriction. The IBs’ ultimate 
goal is to ensure that the investee firms make sound investment and development 
decisions under strict supervision, thereby not only improving the investee firms’ 
operating performance and values based upon their experience as well as their 
knowledge and technical capabilities, while ensuring that they comply with the 
principles of Sharīʿah, which aims to advance human welfare in ethics-based 
financial transactions. In many cases information asymmetry becomes a serious 
issue due to high risk and the limited knowledge of the technical processes. 
Therefore, it is an important task to analyze models based upon the agency 
theory.
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Based upon the classical model inference by Holmstrom’s (1979) 
assumption regarding the agent’s utility function, it is assumed that both principal 
and agents are fully aware that they both rationally pursue the maximization 
of utility. Therefore, the agents strive to increase the firms’ outputs; and then 
principals and agents distribute the outputs according to the compensation 
system. In other words, agents work hard in order to improve the firms’ value, 
thereby increasing their wealth, and thus the agents’ utility is increased. However, 
the firms’ outputs are determined in accordance with the agents’ contributions 
and other reasons beyond the agents’ control. The factors beyond the agents’ 
control are called uncontrollable risk. As far as agency relationship is concerned, 
wealth is the only element that determines the agents’ utility function. However, 
the agents’ utility functions are determined according to their wealth and their 
contributions to the investee firm. Therefore, contributions result in a negative 
utility and the negative utility increases as contributions increase.
Agency relationship research often places equal emphasis on both 
supervision and incentive plans (Shleifer & Vishny, 1997). However, more 
recent research shows that supervision and incentive supplement each other 
(Lin, 2004). IB provides incentive compensation to inspire the entrepreneurs to 
improve the investee firms’ operating performance. The entrepreneurs receive 
bonuses and dividends, in addition to their fixed salaries. The IBs design the 
incentive mechanism to ensure that the clients’ interests are satisfied through 
the entrepreneurs’ decisions and behavior. The control mechanism is designed 
to minimize the agency-related issues and harmonize the relationships between 
principals and agents. IBs differ from conventional fund providers because they 
not only provide funds, but are also required to take part in the administration 
or decision-making processes of the investee firms in order to ensure proper 
compliance with the principles of Islam. If the conventional Agency Theory 
by Amit, Glosten and Muller (1990) is interpreted in the Islamic sense, IBs 
supervise the agents as long as information asymmetry exists between IBs and 
investee firms. Holmstrom (1979) states that agents’ compensation serves as an 
incentive mechanism. However, the supervision mechanism was not included in 
the model. A firm’s production would also be affected by supervision. Therefore, 
following Holmstrom (1979) the principal’s participation is included as the 
supervision mechanism for agents in the model used in this paper.
Holmstrom (1979) incorporates the neo-classical utility theory into 
his model and assumed that human beings pursue maximization of personal 
interests. The Basic Model between Principals and Agents of Holmstrom stresses 
the value of information. But it overlooks the contributions made by technology 
and knowledge to production. The utility function is a useful model to describe 
the behavior of principal and agents. IB behavior can be analyzed in accordance 
with agency theory. In considering model specification and the robustness of 
the inferences, this paper assumes that an agency relationship exists between 
Islamic investors (or IB) and entrepreneurs (investee firms). It thus attempts to 
solve the limitations of the Basic Model between Principals and Agents to create 
a well-defined model of the agency relationship between IB and investee firms.
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Agency theory is incorporated into the Islamic banking model with 
emphasis on the Saving Units (SU) (the investors) contributions to, and influence 
on the Borrowing Units (BU) (the entrepreneurs) when information asymmetry 
exists between the SU and BU. Islamic investors and entrepreneurs are assumed 
to be risk-averters as in standard theory and, as far as the agency relationship is 
concerned, neither party may disturb the other party. This is further complemented 
by their Islamic faith, that is, the relationships are Sharīʿah-compliant as to be 
continually supervised. Therefore, the SUs and BUs attempt to maximize their 
personal utility and abide by the contracts at the same time.
Entrepreneurs act as agents for Islamic investors and are therefore 
required to work in the best interests of the investors. In the light of information 
asymmetry, Islamic investors need to launch incentive plans to inspire the 
entrepreneurs to work for the best interest of the Islamic investors, thereby 
minimizing the conflicts of interest between the entrepreneurs and Islamic 
investors. In other words, the investee firms’ operating performance changes 
the entrepreneurs’ compensation positively, thus the Islamic investors and 
entrepreneurs share a common interest. 
Operating performance determines the profit level. In the case of Islamic 
finance, an incentive plan alone cannot solve the conflicts of interest resulting 
from attitudes towards risk. In this case, the supervision mechanism can reduce 
conflicts of interest and check for any deviation from Islamic principles. As 
stated earlier, IBs provide not only funds, but also extra services to the investee 
firms commensurate with Sharīʿah. Therefore, a key decision variable¾IB 
participation¾is included in the model to determine the contributions made by 
IBs to investee firms. An information asymmetry between the Islamic investors 
and entrepreneurs is assumed; and IB participation serves as a supervisory 
mechanism.As far as the agency relationship between an IB and entrepreneurs 
is concerned, it is assumed that the wealth possessed by the IB, or the difference 
between the firm’s profits and the entrepreneur’s income, determines the IB’s 
utility function. The entrepreneurs’ utility function is determined by the firms’ 
profits and the investee firms’ operational achievement. Further, it is assumed 
that operational advancement creates negative utility for the entrepreneurs. 
This paper adopts the theoretical framework of Holmstrom’s (1979) to explain 
its relevance to IB and financial transactions. Holstrom’s model is extended 
to include the critical contributions made by firms as well as the principals’ 
contributions to operating performance. The model makes the following 
assumptions:
• Firms increase their productivity through operational advancement. 
Therefore, the investee firms’ operating capabilities determine the IB’s 
outputs. Let                 be the investee firm’s operating capability, 
A be the set of relevant technologies and R be the set of real numbers. 
The investee firms are free to choose either to request IBs or research 
institutes for technological transfer or cultivate specialists to upgrade 
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entrepreneurs are likely to determine whether to initiate the decisions 
related to operational improvement based on their personal interests. 
Thus, their decisions affect the firms’ profits;
• Let q represent the IB’s profits. The profits are determined in accordance 
with a number of factors beyond the entrepreneurs’ control, in addition to 
   . These factors are represented by a random variable    ; knowns a random 
state of nature. It is assumed to represent the external environmental 
factors affecting the IB’s profits. It is assumed that the entrepreneurs 
face    after   is selected. In other words, the profits of the IB q are 
determined by the investee firms’ operational capabilities   , together with 
the random variable    ; that is. It is assumed that the entrepreneurs only 
adopt technologies that increase profits. Further, it is assumed that the 
marginal profits created via the investee firms’ operational capabilities 
decrease. Thus                  is continuously differentiable up to the second 
order partial derivative with respect to     and
                                   
(1)
  
• IBs may use a number of methods to provide extra services to investee 
firms and thus help them increase profits. The services include technical 
transfer, supervision and consultation, and help financial administration. 
IBs provide these services to increase the firms’ profits. Let               represent 
IB participation. This paper attempts to find out whether due to IB 
participation, a, help the firms to increase their profits;
• Investors tend to support entrepreneurs to minimize agency-related issues 
between investors and entrepreneurs, and thus prevent entrepreneurs 
from putting their personal interests first and thereby hurting the firms’ 
interests. As far as income compensation is concerned, entrepreneurs are 
entitled to a fixed amount of remuneration and variable compensation 
– bonuses and dividends. The amount of variable compensation is 
determined in accordance with the profits of the investee firms. It is 
assumed that the entrepreneur’s compensation increases as the firms’ 
profit increases. Let       represent the proportion of profits shared 
with the entrepreneurs. An IB helps firms to increase profits through 
participation and, therefore, the firms’ profits are determined by the 
IB’s participation. Hence                    represents the profits of firms with 
IB’s participation and also                                  represents the entrepreneur’s variable 
compensation. Let         represent the fixed amount of compensation for 
entrepreneurs. Then the incentive plan for entrepreneurs is represented by 
the linear structure as follows: 
          .  Set and rearrange
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and
                      (3)
Then C
e  represents the entrepreneurs’ compensation and Cv represents the 
compensation for the Islamic investors.
As the IBs increase their participation, Islamic investors are more 
likely to launch a reward system to encourage entrepreneurs to improve the 
operating performance of the firms, thereby solving the agency-related issues 
between Islamic investors and entrepreneurs and improving the firms’ operating 
performance; thus creating a win-win situation. If the whole process is Sharīʿah 
compliant, Islamic investors are likely to share a higher percentage of profits 
with entrepreneurs as IBs increase their participation in investee firms;
•  Consistent with Holmstrom (1979), this paper assumes that the Von 
Neumann-Morgenstern utility function (abbreviated as VN-M utility 
function) represents the utility functions for the principles and agents. Let
                            
(4)
be the utility function for Islamic investors and
   
                                
(5)
be the utility function for entrepreneurs, where           represents the utility of the
profits earned by the entrepreneurs from the firms and                 represents the negative 
utility created by the investee firms’ technologies for the entrepreneurs. V, M 
and K are assumed to be continuously differentiable up to their second-order 
derivatives. In addition, it is assumed that Islamic investors and entrepreneurs 
are risk averse and their utility increases and marginal utility decreases as their 




                 (6)
Function ( )gK  represents the negative utility created by the investee firms’ 
technologies for the entrepreneurs. The negative effect is assumed to increase 
as the investee firms enhance their operational capabilities for the entrepreneurs 
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(7) 
4.1 Model Inference and Proposition
The contractual behaviors between Islamic investors and entrepreneurs are 
analyzed in the context of the assumptions made at the beginning. Both parties 
understand that the other intends to maximize utility rationally. Therefore, the 
contractual behavior is expressed in the optimization and implications equation 
as follows:
         
               (8) 
        
     
subject to
          
   (9) 
and          
            
     (10) 
   
An optimum strategy or optimal solution of the optimization problem (8)–(10) is 
assumed to exist for the investor. 
According to Equation (8), Islamic investors select the most suitable 
contracts to maximize their expected utility. Equation (9) represents the 
entrepreneurs’ considerations regarding opportunity costs, where ū represents 
the reserved utility level, which assumes entrepreneurs’ expected utility to stay 
above a certain level. In reality, ū is determined in accordance with the market 
situation. If the utility created by the agency contract is lower than the utility 
determined by the market, entrepreneurs are unlikely to accept the agency 
contract. 
Equation (10) relates to the decisions that maximize the entrepreneurs’ 
expected utility under the incentive plan                               . Islamic investors 
are not familiar with the operational capabilities of the investment objects 
when they enter into a contract. The asymmetry of the information between 
Islamic investors and entrepreneurs is characterized by the dependence on g  
in their utilities. Entrepreneurs are likely to initiate the decisions related to the 
operational advancement based upon their personal interest and religious beliefs, 
and thus maximize their expected utility.
The necessary condition of the constraint (10) is given by its first 
order condition with respect tog . Taking the utility function for entrepreneurs 
                   we differentiate this with respect to g  to obtain the necessarycondition
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Taking the expression for entrepreneurs’ compensation given by 
                                        and substituting this in the utility function for entrepreneurs 
                                    we have from (11) that
            (12)
Assume the probability distribution of q  is continuous. It then follows from 
Leibnitz’s rule and (4.1.12) that
        (13)  
       
To simplify the discussion, assume necessary conditions for the implicit function 
theorem to hold so that      can be solved implicitly from equation (1.13) in terms 
of other variables. Therefore     can be determined as a function of (a, p, f), that is, 
To obtain the necessary conditions for the optimization, the Lagrangian multiplier 
is introduced (based on the necessary condition (13) of (10) and (8)−(9)),
              (14) 
 
where l and m	 are the corresponding Lagrangian multipliers. Under the 
assumption of the existence of the optimal solution of the optimization problem, 
the Kuhn-Tucker Theorem (see pp. 740–741 in Chapter 19 in Taha, 1992) 
is used to obtain the following necessary conditions for the optimal solution 
(a*, p*, f*;  g*)1
      (15)       
 
       (16)
 
   
       (17)
           
Therefore, if (a*, p*, f*, g*) is an optimal solution of the optimization problem, it 
should satisfy the necessary conditions (15)–(17). Based on these assumptions, 
g*= g*	(a, p, f) solves the equation (17). After substituting g*=	g(a, p, f)  into (1.15) 
and (1.16), the constrained optimization problem is treated as finding a solution 
in variable (a, p, f). The optimal solution is then substituted, say (a*, p*, f*) , back 
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The following discussion examines how the profit-sharing ratio 
designed by an IB for entrepreneurs and the investee firms’ operational 
capabilities are related. Intuitively, the profit-sharing ratio p designed by the IB 
for the entrepreneurs would encourage the entrepreneurs to improve the investee 
firm’s operational capabilities g. In other words, the entrepreneurs are likely to 
increase the investee’s operational capabilities g as more profits are allocated to 
the entrepreneurs. Mathematically, this suggests that
                    
(18)
The sufficient conditions under which (1.18) holds are now derived.
Denote
(19)
It then follows from the necessary condition (17) that 
(20)
 
Equation (20) is differentiated with respect to g  to obtain 
               (21)
Based on the assumption that the utility function M is twice continuously 
differentiable, Leibnitz’s rule is used to obtain from (19) that






It then follows from (22) and (23) that
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and 
(25)
The sign of         in (1.25) is now examined. From the assumption that 
                                                   
and,               it can be seen from (25) that              
 
 (26)
Noting that            , equation (24) can be rewritten as
(27)
Entrepreneurs’ compensation includes a fixed amount of remuneration and 
variable remuneration (1 + a)q(g, q)p. Therefore, f is considered the entrepreneurs’ 
fixed wealth and the variable remuneration  (1 + a)q(g, q)p is considered a risky 
asset. The entrepreneurs’ risks increase as the risk of the risky asset increases. 
It is assumed that the entrepreneurs avoid risks and the relative risk aversion 
coefficient of the utility function M of entrepreneurs is smaller than one (see 
Huang & Litzenberger (1988) for the definition and related discussion),
             
(28)
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Note that M' > 0  and 1 + a + > 0, we have from (1.29) that
            (30)
Following from the assumption               , we obtain from (27) and (30) that
(31) 
This, together with (26) and (21), leads to (18). It is, therefore shown that (18) 




In other words, if the relative risk aversion coefficient of the utility 
function M of the entrepreneurs is strictly less than one, then as the IB distributes 
a higher percentage of profits to entrepreneurs, the investee firms’ operational 
capabilities are improved.
Similarly, the investees’ operational capabilities are expected to 
increase as the IB increases its participation. Mathematically, this corresponds to
                  
    (32)
Equation (1.32) holds under condition (1.28). Equation (1.20) is differentiated 
with respect to a to obtain 
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Based on the assumption that the utility function M is twice continuously 
differentiable, Leibnitz’s rule is used to obtain from (19) that
        (34)
Note that
It then follows from (1.34) that
         (35)
We have shown  that                  From the assumption that,                                             
condition (1.28) and equation (1.35), we have                It then follows from (33) 




In other words, if the relative risk aversion coefficient of the utility function 
M of the entrepreneurs is strictly less than one, then as the IBs increase their 
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The ultimate purpose of the model is to find out whether the changes 
in IBs’ participation and the changes of the entrepreneurs’ profit-sharing ratio 
affect the investee firms’ operating performance. In this model, profit q(g,q) 
represents the investee firms’ operating performance. Therefore, the following 
are investigated:
      and
It follows from  q =	q(g,q) and that g	=	g	(a, p, f)
                  (36)
It then follows from                         , (18) and (32) that under the same assumption 
as (28)
                 (37)
This leads to the following Proposition 3.
Proposition 3. Assume
then
In other words, if the relative risk aversion coefficient of the utility function M of 
the entrepreneurs is strictly less than one, then the final propositions are:
1 :  As IBs increase their participation, the investee firms’ operating 
performance is improved;
2 :  As IBs share a higher percentage of profits with entrepreneurs, the 
investee firms’ operating performance is improved.
5. Summary and Conclusions
Information asymmetry is a fundamental problem in agency-related issues 
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supervisory measures to the investee firms to overcome both agency-related and 
religious-compliance-related issues. IBs also design the incentive plan to inspire 
the agents, thereby improving the investee firms’ operating performance through 
their participation and incentive system. 
Typically, agency theories stress the value of information and advocate 
that the incentive system encourages the agents to increase the firms’ profits. 
Conventional agency theory stresses the value of information and, as a result, 
overlooks the importance of technology, learning for the firms with respect to 
creating value, and more importantly the role of religion. As stated in Proposition 
1, the investee firms’ operating performance is improved as IBs increase 
their participation. The IBs’ supervision mechanism reduces the information 
asymmetry and therefore, affects the investee firms’ operating performance 
positively. The influence imposed by the incentive plan on the investee firms’ 
operating performance is also examined. 
Proposition 2 states that the investee firms’ operating performance is 
improved as the IB shares a higher percentage of profits to the entrepreneurs. 
Incentive plans launched by IBs affect investee firms’ operating performance 
positively. Over all, if the objective of Islamic banking is to promote the 
welfare of the society then, by carrying out financial services as designed by IB 
principles, IBs will be able to ensure that their activities are socially responsible. 
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